This study investigates loan price and quantity effects of information sharing offices with Regressions. Our findings broadly show that ICT with public credit registries decrease the price of loans and increase the quantity of loans. While the net effects from the interaction of ICT with private credit bureaus do not lead to enhanced financial access, corresponding marginal effects show that ICT can complement private credit bureaus to increase loan quantity and decrease loan prices when certain thresholds of ICT are attained. We compute and discuss the ICT thresholds that are required to make this possible.
Introduction
There have been very few papers that study information sharing for financial access. In particular, we are interested in studying the gains that can be made from information sharing for financial access in the context of Africa, where investments are increasingly needed in order for the continent to evolve and develop. When compared to the rest of the world, the African continent has more room for information and communication technology (henceforth ICT) penetration. Moreover, there are growing concerns that there is excess liquidity in African banking institutions and issues of information asymmetry in the financial sector. A substantial bulk of the current literature on African business accords on the imperative for more sources of investment because, for the most part, privatisation and liberalization projects initiated over the past decades have failed to generate the much needed external finance (see Tuomi, 2011; Rolfe & Woodward, 2004; Darley, 2012; Bartels et al., 2009 ).
Additionally, as documented by Penard et al. (2012) , there is substantial room for improving the penetration of ICT in Africa because ICT growth is stabilizing, as seen in the high-end economies of North America, Europe and Asia. Moreover, according to the authors, there is an uneven penetration in mobile phones and the internet across the continent. For instance, as of 2010, whereas developed countries were experiencing saturation points in mobile phone and internet penetrations, corresponding penetration rates in Africa were respectively 41% and 9.6%. It follows that there is great potential for the leveraging of ICT, especially for development outcomes.
The concerns of surplus liquidity in African financial institutions (see Saxegaard, 2006; Fouda, 2009; Asongu, 2014, p.70 ) are traceable to information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers. In this light, policies conducive to the establishment of information sharing offices have been founded on the need to address the surplus liquidity issues as well as a plethora of factors that are endogenous to increasing information asymmetry, namely: physical access, affordability and eligibility to lending from banks (Allen et al., 2011; Batuo & Kupukile, 2010) .
Studies on information sharing offices have for the most part been positioned on developed countries which, compared to less developed countries, have fewer financial access issues. Accordingly, a substantial chunk of existing literature has focused on countries in the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Latin America and Asia.
Unfortunately, Africa which is facing more severe concerns in financial access has received less scholarly attention in contrast . To put things in perspective, no African country had been studied by Galindo and Miller (2001) . Love and Mylenko (2003) considered a group of four African countries and were followed by Barth et al. (2009) who covered nine countries.
The study by Triki and Gajigo (2014) , is closest to the positioning of our inquiry. They use Probit models to assess 42 African countries for the 2006 to 2009 period. The present inquiry is distinct from Triki and Gajigo (2014) in three main perspectives: data, methodology and policy. In particular, we make use of a larger and more comprehensive dataset of countries for the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] . We use Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) and Instrumental Variable Quantile Regressions (IV QR) in order to address concerns of endogeneity.
While, Triki and Gajigo (2014) have investigated the relationship between credit registries and financial access at the conditional means of access to finance, we believe that it is also important to investigate the linkages throughout the conditional distributions of access to finance in order to articulate financial institutions with low, intermediate and high levels of financial access. The policy relevance of this modelling approach is that blanket cross-country policies designed to improve financial access by means of information sharing offices may not be effective unless they are contingent on existing levels of financial access and tailored differently across financial institutions with different characteristics of financial access. Triki and Gajigo (2014) acknowledge the failure to account for endogeneity as a caveat of their inquiry. Specifications in the present inquiry are tailored to address the concern of endogeneity by controlling for: (i) time invariant omitted variables and simultaneity with the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) approach and (ii) simultaneity and the unobserved heterogeneity with an Instrumental Variable Quantile Regressions (IVQR) approach.
Additionally, in our study ICT-related policy variables are integrated into the modelling exercise in order to examine how internet and mobile phone penetrations complement information sharing offices in decreasing information asymmetry for enhanced financial access, in terms of increased quantity of loans and reduced price of loans 1 .
Overall, assessing loan and price effects of reducing information asymmetry with ICT is of policy interest, because the findings would inform policy makers on complementary instruments to information sharing offices that can be employed to boost access to finance in order to enable poor households and small businesses capitalise on mobilised savings to increase economic consumption, investment and productivity which ultimately culminate in reduced unemployment and higher economic growth.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The stylized facts, background and theoretical underpinnings can be found in Section 2. Section 3 covers the data and methodology. The empirical results and policy implications are discussed in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes and provides future research directions.
Stylized facts, background and theoretical underpinnings

Stylized facts and background
Less than 20% of African households have access to formal financial services (IFAD, 2011) . The stylized facts maintain that the main factors limiting financial access include: poor transport facilities, low population densities and limited communication infrastructure.
According to the narrative, even in regions with comparatively higher rates of financial services, some households and small corporations may still be faced with constraints in lending requirements like strict documentation and collaterals. Moreover, in cases where the underlying requirements in lending are fulfilled, financial access could still be limited by high costs (e.g. transaction fees) and considerable minimum saving requirements.
Credit reference offices are institutions that are designed to collect information on the debt of borrowers (both individual and commercial) from many sources. These include: retail lenders, bank and credit card corporations (mostly for individuals) and public sources (Asongu & Tchamyou, 2016) . Once the data is collected, it is cross-checked for a comprehensive report and consolidated. Such data from credit histories can encompass both positive and negative data. Positive information consists of credit histories on attitudes towards repayment while negative information overwhelmingly consists of default data.
According to Mylenko (2008) , prior to the year 2008, information sharing offices were solidly established for the most part in Asia, Latin America, European and North American countries. However, the global financial crisis and growing ICT, prompted the institution of credit reference agencies across Africa. In essence, before 2008, with the exception of South Africa, not many African countries had well-functioning credit reference bureaus. In addition, the mission of such information sharing offices was substantially restricted to banking sector supervision. Hence, the price of loans remained high for two main reasons. On the one hand the incapacity of credit agencies to provide timely and accurate information on borrowers'
history. On the other hand the absence of relevant technology and incentives. This latter point articulates the complementary role of ICT in facilitating the role of information sharing services on financial access.
Theoretical highlights
Two principal views exist in the literature on the theoretical connection between credit reference agencies and access to finance (see Claus & Grimes, 2003) . The first perspective is oriented towards bank liquidity provisions, whereas the second considers the capacity of financial institutions to enhance assets' risk characteristics. Both views however are founded on the main goal of financial intermediation. This goal is to enhance financial intermediation efficiency by transforming mobilised deposits into credit for economic operators. The theoretical foundations of the linkage between information sharing offices and improved financial intermediation are substantiated by the imperfect market information literature. The principal role of information sharing offices in financial intermediation is to reduce costs in information and transactions, that are the result of information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers in the banking industry.
In the light of the above, the relationship between financial access and information sharing offices, faces two problems: moral hazard from borrowers and adverse selection from lenders. On the one hand, information sharing offices reduce adverse selection in banks by providing them with a comprehensive picture of the credit history of borrowers. Consolidated knowledge on information from borrowers reduces incremental interest rates that would have been levelled by financial institutions in order to compensate for the adverse selection. On the other hand, once loans have been granted to borrowers, they are liable of moral hazard: a behaviour that consists of concealing activities to which the loan is granted with the ultimate aim of avoiding and/or limiting compliance with their financial obligations.
Credit bureaus are also responsible for informing the borrowers on the perils of defaulting on their debts, especially on unsustainability of debt defaults because the informal financial sector is considered as a viable alternative to the formal banking sector. Information sharing offices can thus reduce a borrower's moral hazard by playing a role in market discipline.
In summary: information sharing offices mitigate adverse selection ex-ante of lending while they also reduce moral hazard, ex-post of lending. By conception and definition, the mission of information sharing offices is facilitated by ICT. In line with economic theory, we expect the following signs with regard to bankoriented features. We expect the 'deposit to asset ratio' should increase both the quantity and price of loans. This is because in essence, deposits are the principal source of bank financing.
Data and Methodology
Data
A higher proportion of deposits in liquid liabilities can increase loan quantity and/or interest rate margins, since good organisation is necessary for effectiveness in mobilisation and adequate management. Intuitively, while the number of bank branches should positively affect loan quantity, it should also negatively influence the price of loans.
With regards to market-related features, the following signs are expected. From intuition, GDP per capita (which is included to account for business cycle fluctuations) is expected to influence the quantity of loans positively. Conversely, the anticipated sign for loan price is ambiguous because it is contingent on market dynamism and expansion.
However, if GDP per capita is decreasing over time, it can affect both loan quantity and loan price as a result of decreasing demand. We anticipate negative signs because the population on average across Africa has been growing at a faster rate than GDP, leading to a decreasing GDP per capita for this period (Asongu, 2013a) .
Population density is anticipated to influence both the price and quantity of loans positively. This is because increasing demand for loans, owing to high density in population, increases loan price. Moreover, we anticipate inflation to decrease the quantity of loans and increase the price of loans. This is essentially because investors prefer to invest in economic environments that are less ambiguous (see . In essence,
given that less investment (and hence quantity) of loans are apparent during economic uncertainty (e.g. high inflation), loan price is anticipated to increase with inflation uncertainty because the interest rates levelled on loans are usually adjusted for inflation.
In contrast, establishing anticipated signs for dummy variables is difficult. For example both small and big banks (for bank size heterogeneity) can be associated with positive and negative effects resulting from loan dynamics, though big banks are comparatively more associated with management and coordination issues linked to bank size.
Furthermore, addressing the challenges that come with increasing bank size is also a cause of inefficiency, owing to issues encountered with resolving conflicts related to customer needs and requirements. In the same vein, the incidence of foreign versus domestic banks (ownership heterogeneity) and Islamic versus non-Islamic banks (compliance with Sharia finance) depends on a multitude of features, which include: market dynamism and expansion as well as staffs' organisational capabilities.
Appendix 1 summarizes the expected signs of the control variables and Appendix 2 provides the definitions and source of variables employed in the study. Appendix 3 and
Appendix 4 respectively present the summary statistics and correlation matrix.
Methodology
Generalised methods of moments: specification, identification and exclusion restrictions
The GMM empirical approach is adopted by this inquiry for five principal reasons.
While the first-two are basic requirements for using the estimation strategy, the last-three are advantages that are associated with the choice of the empirical approach.
(1) The empirical approach takes into account persistence in loan quantity and price given that the criterion or rule of thumb to ascertain persistence in the two dependent variables is met. In essence, the correlation between loan price and loan quantity and their first lags are respectively 0.845 and 0.996, which are above the 0.800 rule of thumb.
(2) The N (or 162)>T(or 11) criterion needed for a GMM technique is also met given that the number of time series in each cross section is lower than the number of cross sections.
(3) Endogeneity is accounted for in all regressors by the estimation technique because instrumental variables are employed for suspected endogenous regressors. Moreover, the use of time-invariant omitted variables also enables some bite on endogeneity.
(4) Biases in the difference estimator are addressed with the system estimator.
(5) Cross-country variations are incorporated into the specifications.
As shown by Bond et al. (2001) , the system GMM estimator used by Arellano & Bond (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998) has better estimation properties than the difference estimator used in Arellano & Bond (1991) . This inquiry adopts an extension by Roodman (2009ab) of Arellano and Bover (1995) which uses forward orthogonal deviations instead of first differences because the empirical strategy has been documented by Baltagi (2008) and Love and Zicchino (2006) to restrict over-identification or limit instrument proliferation. In the specification, a two-step approach is adopted because it controls for heteroscedasticity.
The following equations in levels (1) and first difference (2) summarize the estimation procedure for loan quantity. (1) and (2) are replicated when the dependent variable is loan price.
As concerns exclusion restrictions and identification, all explanatory variables are considered as suspected endogenous or predetermined variables whereas only years are acknowledged to be strictly exogenous (this is consistent with Dewan & Ramaprasad, 2014; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a) , essentially because it is not likely for years to become endogenous in first difference (see Roodman, 2009b) . Therefore, the procedure for treating ivstyle (years) is 'iv (years, eq(diff))' whereas the gmmstyle is used for suspected endogeneous variables.
With the above background, the strictly exogenous instruments or years influence the outcome variables exclusively through the suspected endogenous or predetermined variables.
Furthermore, the statistical validity of the exclusion restriction is assessed with the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for instrument exogeneity. Accordingly, the null hypothesis of this test
should not be rejected for the instruments to elucidate loan quantity and loan price exclusively via the predetermined variables. Hence, whereas in the standard instrumental variable (IV) estimation technique, failure to reject the null hypothesis of the Sargan Overidentifying
Restrictions (OIR) test is an indication that instruments do not elicit the outcome variable beyond the endogenous variables (see Beck et al., 2003; , in the GMM approach which employs forward orthogonal deviations, the information criterion employed to investigate if years exhibit strict exogeneity is the DHT. Therefore, in the findings that are reported in Section 4, the exclusion restriction assumption is validated if the alternative hypothesis of the DHT corresponding to IV (year, eq(diff)) is rejected.
Instrumental Quantile regressions
In order to account for existing levels of loan price and loan quantity, the current study The existing literature on information sharing has been oriented towards the conditional mean of financial access (see Triki & Gajigo, 2014) . While mean impacts are relevant, the underlying literature is extended with an estimation approach that controls for existing levels of loan price and quantity. In addition, studies that use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to emphasise mean effects are based on the assumption that error terms are normally distributed. However, with QR, the hypothesis of normally distributed errors does not hold. In addition, the QR is robust to presence of outliers because parameters are estimated at various points in the conditional distribution of the dependent variable (Koenker & Bassett, 1978) .
The concern about endogeneity is addressed by using an Instrumental Variable QR (IVQR) procedure. The instrumentation procedures for an information sharing office (e.g. private credit bureaus) and an ICT indicator (e.g. Internet penetration) are respectively in Eqs.
(3) and (4) 
Where:
Internet , , is the internet penetration rate of bank i at period t ,  is a constant, 
where,
As opposed to OLS that is fundamentally based on minimizing the sum of squared residuals, with QR, the weighted sum of absolute deviations are minimised. For example, the 10 th or 25 th quintiles (with  =0.10 or 0.25 respectively) are examined by approximately weighing the residuals. The conditional quintile of financial access or i y given i x is:
where, unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quintile.
This formulation is analogous to
in the OLS slope where parameters are investigated only at the mean of the conditional distribution of loan quantity and price.
For the model in Eq. (6) Table 1 and Table 2 present GMM results related to loan price and loan quantity respectively.
Empirical results
Presentation of results
Each table has eight specifications, consisting of four specifications pertaining respectively to public credit registries and private credit bureaus. Each of the set of four specifications has two sub-sets of specifications pertaining respectively to mobile phone and internet penetrations. Each of the ICT-related specification embodies two more sub-specifications reflecting a full sample and a partial sample.
The full sample is from 2001-2011 while the partial sample is from 2005-2011. Two main reasons motivate the choice of a partial sample. It enables the study to limit concerns about over-identification or instrument proliferation because T is reduced from 11 to 7. Moreover, the data on information sharing offices in most countries is only available from the year 2005.
We employ four principal information criteria to assess the validity of the GMM model with forward orthogonal deviations. 3 Based on the information criteria, the following findings can be established. From the third specification of Table 1 , we see that the net effect from the interaction between public credit registries and mobile phones is 0.0019 (([-0.00003 × 34.107] + 0.003), when the mean value of mobile phone penetration is 34.107, the unconditional effect of public credit registries equals 0.003, while the corresponding unconditional impact of it is seen to be -0.00003. We thus find that there is a negative marginal effect and a positive net effect, for the role of mobile phones in public credit registries, for financial access in the perspective of loan prices.
In Table 2 , we find that there is a positive net effect from the interaction between private credit bureaus and mobile phones (of 0.0006). We find that the significant control variables in Tables 1 and 2 , have the expected signs as hypothesised in Section 3.1. (Asongu & De Moor, 2016, p.9) (Table 3 and Table 5 ) while the other is on loan quantity (Table 4 and Table 6 ).
See Tables 1-2 , for the findings in terms of marginal and net effects; for the purpose of the computation of net effects, mean values are based on instrumented ICT values, notably:
37.019 is the instrumented mean value of mobile phone penetration whereas 7.809 is the instrumented mean value of internet penetration. For all tables: (i) the consistent differences in estimated coefficients in OLS versus quintiles (with respect to sign, significance and magnitude of significance) justify the relevance of the QR empirical strategy and (ii) 'mobile phone'-related regressions are disclosed on the left-hand-side whereas internet-oriented estimations are presented on the right-hand-side.
The following findings can be established from Table 3 on price effects of public credit registries with ICT: The net effect from the interaction between public credit registries and mobile phones is negative in bottom quintiles; while the net effect from the interaction between public credit registries and internet is positive from the 0.25 th to the 0.75 th quintiles.
In Table 4 on loan effects from public credit registries with ICT, the net effect from the interaction between public credit registries and the mobile phone is positive in the 0.25 th quintile whereas the net effect from the interaction between public credit registries and the internet is positive in the 0.25 th and 0.50 th quintiles.
In Table 5 , private credit bureaus with the internet have a positive net effect on loan prices in the 0.75 th quintile. In Table 6 , private credit bureaus with the internet (mobile phone) have a negative net effect on loan quantity in the 0. 
Further discussion of results and policy implications
This section reconciles the relationship of the findings with existing literature and further explores the implications of the findings in terms of how unexpected results can be leveraged for enhanced financial access. From the findings it is apparent that the relationship between ICT and public credit registries leads to increased financial access, compared to the nexus between ICT and private credit bureaus. Our findings are not directly comparable with the engaged studies in the introduction which have directly examined the relationship between information sharing offices and financial access. Our assessment of the nexus between information sharing offices and access to finance is not direct because the relationship is contingent on the role of ICT. Nonetheless, we take a minimalist approach by assuming that ICT also indirectly influenced the role of information sharing offices in financial access, established in previous studies. offices. This narrative is consistent with this study because from our sample, public credit registries are more developed compared to private credit bureaus. The perspective is substantiated by Appendix 5 which shows that compared to public credit registries, private credit bureaus are less apparent in many countries.
Conversely, our findings do not align with Love and Mylenko (2003) who have established that private credit bureaus are associated with more financial access when compared with public credit registries. Our findings are also not consistent with Triki and Gajigo (2014) who have concluded that countries with private credit bureaus enjoy higher levels of financial access relative to countries with public credit registries or neither institution.
It is also important to explore how the unexpected findings from private credit bureaus can be leveraged to enhance financial access. Accordingly, we have seen from the Quantile Regressions findings that private credit bureaus increase (resp. decrease) loan price (resp. quantity). Fortunately, corresponding marginal effects are negative (resp. positive). This implies that at certain thresholds of ICT, the unconditional positive (resp. negative) effect from private credit bureaus on loan prices (resp. quantity) can be changed to negative (resp. positive). Hence the price effect of private credit bureaus with internet penetration in the 0.75 th of Table 5 can become negative if internet penetration reaches a threshold of 15 (0.0006/0.00004) per 100 people. This internet threshold makes economic sense because it is within the range (minimum to maximum) of internet penetration provided by the summary statistics (0.037 to 51.000).
In the light of the above, in Table 6 
Conclusion and future research directions
This study has investigated loan price and quantity effects of information sharing 
